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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Brent Arden Reece appeals from the district court's order summarily
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In July 2010, Jerome police officer Edward Gates received a call from
dispatch about a reckless driver. (R., p.47.) The reporting party observed the
driver run a stop sign, fishtail, and then nearly collide with her vehicle. (R., p.42.)
After the reporting party informed police, she followed the driver and observed
him to be Brent Reece, an individual she was familiar with. (R., pp.42-43.) The
reporting party then returned home to her apartment complex, where she awaited
police. (R., p.43.) Before police arrived, Reece pulled into the same apartment
complex parking lot and entered an apartment there. (Id.)
Officer Gates arrived at the scene, spoke with the reporting party, and
then knocked on the door of the apartment Reece had entered. (R., pp.47-48.)
Reece stepped outside and admitted he had been drinking that evening and that
he had just driven home. (R., p.48.) Officer Gates then initiated field sobriety
tests. (Id.) Reece failed some of the field sobriety tests, and refused or failed to
complete others. (R., pp.48-53.) Officer Gates also observed that Reece was
slurring his speech, and was having trouble following directions and keeping his
balance. (R., p.50.) Officer Gates arrested Reece on suspicion of driving under
the influence and transported him to the jail. (R., pp.53-54.)
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Upon arrival at the jail, Reece refused to submit to a breathalyzer test.
(R., p.55.)

Officer Gates and several jail deputies transported Reece to a

hospital, where he was subjected to a forced blood, which Reece verbally and
physically resisted. (Id.) The blood was sent to the Idaho State Lab in Pocatello,
where testing performed by forensic scientist Lamora Lewis revealed a .110
blood alcohol content. (R., pp.55-57, 74-80, 102-103.)
The state charged Reece (who had a prior felony DUI conviction within the
previous 10 years), with felony driving under the influence and the persistent
violator sentencing enhancement.

See State v. Reece, 2012 Unpublished

Opinion No. 644, Docket No. 38661 (Idaho App., September 24, 2012). After a
trial, the jury found Reece guilty of the charge and the enhancement. (kl; R.,
pp.39-99.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of 25 years with seven
years fixed.

Reece, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 644.

On direct appeal,

Reece asserted that the sentence was excessive, but the Idaho Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court. Id.
In 2011, the Idaho State Police conducted an administrative investigation
of several employees of the Idaho State Police Forensic Services.

(R., pp.14-

32.) The ensuing report, disclosed in February 2012, stated that state forensic
scientist Lewis and others maintained an ongoing unauthorized quantity of
controlled narcotics for display purposes, outside the practices of the Forensics
Quality Manual and without proper documentation tracking and auditing, as far
back as 2003. (Id.) The display drugs were used for tours of the facility. (Id.)
Lewis admitted to being aware of and failing to report the existence of the display

2

narcotics, but denied knowledge of where the narcotics originally came from.
(R., pp.20-22.)

She told investigators that the practice of maintaining the

narcotics was already in place when she began employment with the Idaho State
Lab.

(Id.)

The report concluded that there

no evidence any testing was

misconduct, and no reason to be
accreditation would be

that the laboratory's

(R., p.14.)

Reece then filed a petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.3-13.) Reece
asserted: (1) the state committed a Brady1 violation by failing to disclose Lewis'
misconduct; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress
evidence obtained by a forced blood draw in light of Missouri v. McNeely, _
U.S.

133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013); and (3) his trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to object to the admission of certain state witness testimony at trial. (Id.)
The district court entered a notice of intent to summarily dismiss each of
Reece's claims. (R., pp.159-178.) Reece filed a response to the district court's
notice.

(R., pp.179-194.)

The district court then dismissed Reece's post-

conviction petition after concluding that Reece failed to assert facts that would, if
true, entitle him to relief as to any of his claims. (R., pp.200-223.) The district
court also dismissed Reece's subsequent motion for reconsideration, in which
Reece asserted that the court failed to give him adequate notice of dismissal as
to his Brady claim. (R., pp.224-230.) Reece timely appealed. (R., p.231.)

1

Brady v. Maryland, 837 U.S. 83 (1963).
3

ISSUES

states

on appeal as:

1.

err when it summarily dismissed Reece's
by finding that the District Court would not have
the impeachment evidence during the underlying
criminal trial and that the lack of the impeachment evidence
during the underlying criminal trial did
prejudice Reece?

2.

Did the trial court err when it summarily dismissed Reece's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim by holding that the
legal analysis of State v. Diaz was grounds to summarily
dismiss the claim?

3.

Did the trial court err when it did not give Reece the
opportunity to respond to its legal reasoning in its
Memorandum Decision?

(Appellant's brief, p.6)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Reece failed to show the district court erred by summarily dismissing
his Brady claim concerning Pocatello lab misconduct?

2.

Has Reece failed to show the district court erred by summarily dismissing
his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to
suppress evidence obtained by a forced blood draw?

3.

Has Reece failed to show that the district court failed to give Reece proper
notice before summarily dismissing his Brady claim?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Reece Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing
His Brady Claim Concerning Pocatello Lab Misconduct

A

Introduction
Reece contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his

Brady claim concerning misconduct committed by Idaho State Lab forensic
scientist Lamora Lewis. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-13.) However, a review of the
record reveals that Reece failed to establish a Brady violation because he failed
to demonstrate prejudice from any lack of required disclosure.

B.

Standard Of Review
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file .... " Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).

C.

Reece Failed To Establish A Brady Violation
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for

post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own
initiative.

"To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must

present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,
5

583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to
summary dismissal "if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of
material fact" as to each element of the petitioner's claims. Workman, 144 Idaho
at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72,
90 P.3d at 297.
Due process requires the prosecution to disclose to the defense all
exculpatory evidence known to the state or in its possession. Brady v. Maryland,
837 U.S. 83 (1963).

The duty to disclose includes impeachment evidence.

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).

When there has been a

conviction after trial, a Brady violation is found if the defendant can show: (1) that
the evidence was exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that the evidence was
suppressed by the state; and (3) materiality (i.e. prejudice). State v. Shackelford,
150 Idaho 355, 380, 247 P.3d 582, 607 (2010) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527
U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)). In a Brady analysis, prejudice is shown if there is a
reasonable probability that, had the withheld evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Kyles v.

Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,434 (1995). A "reasonable probability" of a different result
is

shown

when

the

government's

suppression

of evidence

undermines

confidence in the outcome of the trial. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; State v. Gardner,
126 Idaho 428,436, 885 P.2d 1144, 1152 (2013).
At Reece's trial, Lamora Lewis testified about the general procedures that
occur when evidence is submitted to the state lab.

(R., pp.77-79.)

She also

testified that she followed these procedures when processing and ultimately
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testing Reece's blood, as she does with all evidence she receives. (Id.) While
Reece could arguably show that the subsequently-disclosed evidence of Lewis'
misconduct constituted evidence that could have been utilized at trial to impeach
Lewis' testimony that she follows protocol with all evidence, he has failed to show
that the evidence was so damning that its absence undermines confidence in the
outcome of the trial.
In denying Reece's Brady claim, the district court cited the applicable
standards and correctly concluded that Reece failed to establish prejudice. (R.,
pp.207-210.) The court recognized that the "misconduct that was discovered did
not concern the mishandling of evidence in any case; did not concern the
procedures or protocol used in testing blood for alcohol concentration; and does
not suggest or indicate that the reliability of any test results were compromised in
any way."

(R., pp.208-209.)

Indeed, there was no nexus between Lewis'

misconduct of maintaining an unauthorized quantity of narcotics for display
purposes and the testing results that actually incriminated Reece at his trial, or
any other evidence from any other case.
Additionally, Reece offered no expert testimony at the trial or in the course
of the post-conviction proceeding to either challenge the results of blood test, or
to attempt to explain how any lab misconduct may have altered the results; nor
did Reece seek to have the sample tested himself.
The Idaho Court of Appeals recently came to a similar conclusion, albeit in
dicta, in another case involving the Pocatello State Lab misconduct.

7

State v.

Schultz, 2 2013 WL 6840174 (Ct. App. 2013).

Schultz, who pied guilty to

possession of methamphetamine, raised a post-conviction Brady claim regarding
the misconduct of another state lab forensic scientist, who, like Lewis, admitted
to being aware of and failing to report the existence of the display narcotics at the
Pocatello lab.

kt

The Court rejected Schultz's Brady claim because a state has

no duty to disclose impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement
with a defendant.

kt

(citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633, (2002)).

However, the Court also noted that Schultz failed to establish prejudice from any
lack of disclosure:
Schultz is also unable to establish prejudice because there is
no nexus between the misconduct and the testing of the
methamphetamine. Nothing about the State's new disclosures goes
to the foundation of Schultz's case or otherwise serves to
undermine confidence in the outcome of these proceedings. See
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,717,215 P.3d 414,437 (2009).
Schultz. 2013 WL 6840174 at *5, n.2.
Reece has failed to demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability of
acquittal had the state disclosed evidence of Lewis' lab misconduct prior to trial.
He has therefore also failed to allege facts from which he was entitled to relief on
his Brady claim, or shown that the district court erred in summarily dismissing
that claim.

2

Reece did not have the benefit of the Court's opinion in Schultz when he wrote
his Appellant's brief.

8

D.

In The Alternative. Reece Also Failed To Show That The Evidence Of
Lewis' Misconduct Was Admissible Impeachment Evidence
In its notice of intent to dismiss Reece's Brady claim, the district court

stated that had the state disclosed Lewis' misconduct prior to trial, it would likely
not have permitted Reece to use such evidence to impeach Lewis's trial
testimony.

(R., p.176.)

In other words, the district court indicated that the

testimony was not admissable impeachment testimony. While the district court
did not rely on this ground in ultimately dismissing Reece's petition (R., p.207), it
is a ground for which Reece had notice, and is thus a potential alternative ground
upon which this Court may affirm the district court's summary dismissal of the
claim.
As noted above, Lewis testified at trial that she followed a particular set of
required procedures with regard to "every sample that [she] receive[s]."
p.78.)

On appeal, Reece contends that this testimony opened the door for

impeachment testimony regarding Lewis' misconduct.
13.)

(R.,

(Appellant's brief, pp.8-

However, Lewis' misconduct did not concern any evidence that she

"received" as a part of any criminal investigation or trial proceeding.

To the

contrary, Lewis told investigators that she did not know the origin of the display
narcotics, and that the practice of maintaining the narcotics was already in place
when she began employment with the Idaho State Lab. (R., pp.20-22.) Thus,
evidence of Lewis' misconduct did not speak to her credibility in testing evidence,
or in following required protocol with regard to evidence actually received.
Because Reece has failed to establish that evidence of Lewis' misconduct
would have been admissible impeachment evidence, this Court may affirm the
9

district court's summarily dismissal of

Brady claim on this alternative

ground.

11.
Reece Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing
His Claim That His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Move To
Suppress Evidence Obtained By A Forced Blood Draw

A.

Introduction
Reece contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his

claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress
evidence obtained by a forced blood draw.

(Appellant's brief, pp.13-15.)

However, a review of the record reveals that Reece failed to allege facts that
would entitle him to an evidentiary hearing on this claim.

Specifically, Reece

failed to make even a prima facie showing that any motion to suppress the blood
evidence would have been successful.

B.

Standard Of Review
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file .... " Workman, 144 Idaho at 523, 164 P.3d at 803 (citing GilpinGrubb, 138 Idaho at 80, 57 P.3d at 791 ).
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C.

Reece Failed To Raise A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact With Respect To
His Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim
As discussed above, Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal

of an application for post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on
the court's own initiative. A claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary
dismissal "if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact" as
to each element of the petitioner's claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d
at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must
demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129,
137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). An attorney's performance is not constitutionally
deficient unless it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there
is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718
P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248
(Ct. App. 1989). "[S]trategic or tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on
appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance
of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." Baldwin
v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 177 P.3d 362, 367-68 (2008).
In a post-conviction proceeding challenging an attorney's failure to pursue
a motion in the underlying criminal action, the district court may consider the
probability of success of the motion in question in determining whether the
attorney's inactivity constituted incompetent performance.
11

Boman v. State, 129

Idaho 520, 526, 927 P.2d 910, 916 (Ct. App. 1996). \/\/here the alleged deficiency
is counsel's failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued,
would not have been granted by the trial court is generally determinative of both
prongs of the Strickland test.

1st

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. "A
warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain
special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v.
Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971 ); see also State v. Ferreira, 133
Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999)).

Consent is such an

exception to the warrant requirement, and may be implied under Idaho's implied
consent statute.

State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302-03, 160 P.3d 739, 741-42

(2007). A separate exception, exigency, has also been recognized in the context
of DUI investigation blood draws.

1st

In this case, Reece asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to move for the suppression of the blood evidence in light of the recent United
States Supreme Court opinion of Missouri v. McNeely, _

U.S. _, 133 S.Ct.

1552 (2013) (R., pp.7-9.) In McNeely, the United State Supreme Court held that
a driving under the influence investigation did not create a per se exigency
warrant exception.

McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552.

However, as the district court

recognized, McNeely only addressed the exigency exception to the warrant
requirement, and that the officers' drawing of Reece's blood was justified
separately by Idaho's implied consent statute. (R., pp.210-212.)

12

Indeed,

this

Court

has

clearly

stated

that

consent and

circumstances are different exceptions to the warrant requirement

exigent

Diaz, 144

Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 741 ("Exigency, however, is not the lone applicable
exception here; consent is also a well-recognized exception to the warrant
requirement"); see also State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 712-13, 184 P.3d 215,
218-19 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Even if the exigent circumstances exception was
inapplicable, the blood draw was valid pursuant to DeWitt's implied consent.").
The Supreme Court of the United States also recognized this distinction in
McNeely.

In that case, the only question before the Court was "whether the

natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream presents a per se exigency
that justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for
nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases." McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at
1556. The Court held that "exigency in this context must be determined case by
case based on the totality of the circumstances."

kl

Thus, the issue was limited

to "nonconsensua/ blood testing" (emphasis added) and the holding was limited
to the exigent circumstances exception. Thus, blood draws justified by implied

13

consent, such as at issue in this case, were not within the scope of either the
issue or the holding in McNeely. 3
On appeal, Reece also attempts to distinguish Diaz on the ground that
Diaz did not physically and verbally resist the blood draw, as Reece did.
(Appellant's brief, pp.13-14.)

Reece however, has offered no binding legal

authority supporting the significance of this distinction. To the contrary, the Idaho
Court of Appeals has indicated that Idaho's implied consent statute permits
officers to "forcibly" draw blood where they have reasonable grounds to believe a
person was driving under the influence. State v. LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905, 243
P.3d 1093 (Ct. App. 2010). In LeClereq, the Court upheld a conviction where an
officer advised a DUI suspect that if she did not submit to a breath test, he would
take her to the hospital for a "forced" blood draw.

kL

The Court recognized that

an officer's threat is not is not coercive if the threat "merely informs the suspect of
the officer's intention to do something that is within the officer's authority based
on the circumstances."

kt at 911,

243 P.3d at 1099 (quoting State v. Garcia, 143

Idaho 774, 779, 152 P.3d. 645, 650 (Ct. App. 2006)).
Further, even if the holding of McNeely would have somehow rendered the
blood evidence inadmissible in this case, Reece's trial counsel could not rely on it

Additionally, Reece has failed to show that the warrantless blood draw was not
also justified by the exigency exception. In McNeely, while the United States
Supreme Court held there was no per se exigency exception to the warrant
requirement for blood draws in DUI investigations, it also indicated that such
exigency could still be found on a case-by-case basis. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at
1556-1568. In the present case, Reece was not contacted by officers until
sometime after the reporting party observed him driving. (See R., pp.40-99.)
This created a greater exigency for collection of evidence than exists in a typical
DUI investigation, in which an officer observes the suspect driving immediately
prior to the commencement of the investigation.
3
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in determining whether to file a motion to suppress because it was published two
years after Reece's trial.

There is no general duty on behalf of counsel to

anticipate changes in the law. Piro v. State, 146 Idaho 86, 91-92, 190 P.3d 905,
910-911 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Green v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 1115, 1125 (5 th Cir.
1997)); see also Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9 th Cir. 1994) (holding that
counsel cannot be required to anticipate later decisions.) At the time of Reece's
2010 trial, the Idaho Court of Appeals recognized that, "[i]t [was] well established
that blood draws to test for alcohol concentration [were] within this exigency
exception because blood alcohol content diminishes over time, and valuable
evidence would be lost in the time required to obtain a warrant." DeWitt, 145
Idaho 709, 184 P.3d 215 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71
(1966); State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 370, 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989); State
v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470, 65 P.3d 211 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Cooper, 136
Idaho 697, 700-701, 39 P.3d 637, 640-641 (Ct. App. 2001 )). Any attempt by
Reece's counsel to pursue a motion using the theory that later became the
holding of McNeely would likely have been unsuccessful in 2010. 4
Reece has failed to show that any attempt by his trial counsel to suppress
blood evidence from his trial would have been successful.

He has therefore

failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file such a

Reece's trial counsel also did not have the benefit of State v. Butler, 302 P.3d
609, 613 (Ariz. 2013), another case on which Reece relies (Appellant's brief,
pp.14-15), in which the Arizona Supreme Court held that "independent of
[Arizona's implied consent statute], the Fourth Amendment requires an arrestee's
consent to be voluntary to justify a warrantless blood draw."
4
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motion, and has failed to show that the district court erred in summarily
dismissing this claim.

111.
Reece Has Failed To Show That The District Court Failed To Give Reece Proper
Notice Before Summarily Dismissing His Brady Claim

A.

Introduction
Reece contends that the district court failed to provide him adequate

notice before summarily dismissing his Brady claim.

(Appellant's brief, pp.15-

16.) However, the district court's notice of intent to dismiss was sufficient to put
Reece on notice that it intended to dismiss his Brady claim on the ground that
Reece failed to assert facts that if true, would satisfy the required prongs of a
Brady analysis, including prejudice.

B.

The District Court Provided Adequate Notice Before Dismissing Reece's
Brady Claim
Idaho Code § 19-4906 provides for the summary disposition of an

application for post-conviction relief upon motion by a party or on the court's own
initiative.
1995).

Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897, 899, 908 P.2d 590, 592 (Ct. App.
"When the court considering the petition for post-conviction relief is

contemplating dismissal sua sponte, it must notify the parties of its intention to
dismiss and must provide its reasons for the potential dismissal." Banks v. State,
123 Idaho 953, 954, 855 P.2d 38, 39 (1993) (citations omitted); see also I.C. §
19-4906(b). The purpose of the notice requirement of I.C. § 19-4906(b) is to give
the petitioner the opportunity to provide further legal authority or evidence to
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establish a genuine issue of material fact. Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 418,
825 P.2d 1073, 1074 (1991); State v. Christensen, 102 Idaho 487,489, 632 P.2d
676, 678 (1981); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 818, 892 P.2d 488, 493 (Ct.
App. 1995).
Notice is not sufficient if it merely reiterates the language of the UPCPA
and contends the post-conviction petitioner is not entitled to relief. Banks, 123
Idaho at 954, 855 P.2d at 39.

Rather, the notice must "identify with ...

particularity why the district court deemed [petitioner's] evidence or legal theories
to be deficient." Downing v. State, 132 Idaho 861,864,979 P.2d 1219, 1222 (Ct.
App. 1999). The notice must give the UPCPA petitioner a meaningful opportunity
to provide further legal authority or evidence that may demonstrate the existence
of a genuine factual issue. Martinez, 126 Idaho at 818, 892 P.2d at 493.
In this case, the district court entered a notice of intent to sua sponte
dismiss Reece's petition for post-conviction relief and all of the claims contained
within, including his Brady claim concerning the misconduct of state forensic
scientist Lamora Lewis. (R, pp.159-178.) On appeal, Reece narrowly describes
the court's stated ground for dismissal in its notice as being that evidence of the
misconduct would not be admissible at trial because it would have "confused the
issues." (Appellant's brief, pp.15-16.) However, a review of the district court's
notice of intent reveals a broader basis for the proposed dismissal. The district
court recited the applicable facts and law, including Brady, and then stated:
The jury had the opportunity to judge Lewis's credibility, as
she testified regarding the handling of the Petitioner's blood test
results. Had the report or any information regarding the lab's
inadequate practices been available at the time of the trial, this
17

Court would not have likely allowed the Petitioner to impeach Lewis
because the information would have confused the issues. The
report does not indicate any mishandling of evidence in cases,
including the Petitioner's case. Lewis and other staff members'
failure to abide by internal policy, does not render their handling of
all evidence invalid. The investigation into the staff members was
unrelated to Lewis' testimony regarding the Petitioner's test results.
The Petitioner was given a full and fair opportunity to crossexamine Lamora Lewis with regard to show she handled evidence
in this case.
(R., p.176.)
First, it is apparent that the district court intended to dismiss Reece's postconviction claim because he failed to assert facts that would demonstrate a
Brady violation, as opposed to some procedural ground.

Further, while the

district court did not expressly recite the three required prongs an individual must
demonstrate to successfully assert a Brady violation, its stated rationale for
dismissal touched upon both whether the proposed evidence actually constituted
impeachment evidence, and whether Reece was prejudiced by the lack of
disclosure.

In the latter respect, the court recognized the limited evidentiary

value of the proposed evidence. This notice provided Reece the opportunity to
present additional facts or legal argument on the issue of how the evidence
would have resulted in an acquittal.
Reece responded to this notice, and specifically asserted that he had
satisfied each of the three Brady prongs, including prejudice. (R., pp.181-186.)
Thus, Reece appeared to understand the district court's notice of dismissal as
stating that Reece failed to demonstrate a Brady violation as a matter of law, and
that prejudice was a component of that analysis.
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The district court then summarily dismissed Reece's Brady claim on the
grounds that he failed to demonstrate prejudice. (R., pp.206-210.) Much of the
court's analysis was similar to that contained in its notice of intent to dismiss.
The court stated:
The sole issue on this particular claim is whether the failure
to disclose the misconduct on the part of Ms. Lewis was prejudicial
to the petitioner. The misconduct that was discovered did not
concern the mishandling the evidence in any case; did not concern
the procedures or protocol used in testing blood for alcohol
concentration; and does not suggest or indicate that the reliability of
any test results were compromised in any way.
(R., pp.208-209.)
The district court's notice of intent to dismiss was thus sufficient to put
Reece on notice that it intended to summarily dismiss his Brady claim on the
grounds that he had failed to allege facts that would satisfy the prongs of a Brady
analysis, including prejudice.

This Court should therefore affirm the district

court's summary dismissal of this claim.

C.

Even If The District Court's Notice Of Intent To Dismiss The Bradv Claim
Was Inadequate, Any Such Error Was Harmless
"The [post-conviction] notice procedure is necessary so that the applicant

is afforded an opportunity to respond and to establish a material issue of fact if
one exists." Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 865, 243 P.3d 675, 681 (Ct App.
2010) (citation omitted); see also Bakerv. State, 142 ldaho411, 422-423, 128
P.3d 948, 958-959 (Ct App. 2005) ("Baker was not left with an 'invisible target'
and was able to respond in a meaningful way to the district court's notice of intent
to dismiss."); Franck-Teel v. State, 143 Idaho 664, 671, 152 P.3d 25, 32 (Ct. App.
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2006) ("Nevertheless, if Franck-Teel's response to the state's motion for
summary dismissal reveals that she understood the basis for dismissal ... , then
we will conclude that the inadequacy of notice was harmless error.").
In this case, despite the asserted lack of adequate notice, Reece in fact
did respond to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss and argued, among
other things, that he established prejudice from the lack of disclosure of the lab
misconduct. (R., p.185.) Reece has not attempted to speculate what different
facts he would have alleged, or how his response would have otherwise been
different if the district court more expressly and specifically stated prejudice as a
potential grounds for dismissal.
Because Reece had and took the opportunity to argue that he was
prejudiced by the lack of disclosure of the lab misconduct, any deficiency in the
district court's notice of intent to dismiss Reece's Brady claim is harmless.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order summarily dismissing Reece's petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 18th day of February, 2014

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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